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• 
 
My topic is materiality and how ideas on materiality from my field—STS, science and 
technology studies—might cross over into management and organisation studies. 
‘Sociomateriality’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008) is already an important topic in management 
and organisations, but I will try to widen the frame. We can start with technologies of the self, 
then turn to industry and technoscience, and finally explore an odd form of management 
which builds in the perspective I want to develop. The overall idea is to multiply our sense of 
the many different ways in which matter is interwined with us.  
 
First we should get clear on what the problem is. The problem, as I see it, is that since 
Descartes, western philosophy, social science and even commonsense have taken for granted 
a dualist ontology of people and things. We are different in kind from animals, machines and 
nature, inasmuch as we have something special that the rest of creation lacks: souls, reason, 
knowledge, language. And this difference is also an asymmetry. We are the only genuine 
agents in history. We have will, intention, goals and plans, whereas the nonhumans are 
machine-like, predictable, passive, waiting for the imposition of our will. We call the shots. 
This sort of human exceptionalism, as I call it, is nonsense, but it is the key to understanding 
the form that the human sciences take today (Pickering 2008). Sociology since Durkheim has 
generated a fabulous range of resources for thinking about autonomous active human beings 
as if they were masters of a passive universe. 
 
Challenging this picture is not as simple as one might hope. In my experience, it entails a 
paradigm shift, in Thomas Kuhn’s sense. The trick, I would say, is to change our conception 
of agency in a way that enables us to come at the world from a new angle. We should stop 
thinking about agency in terms of will, intention, calculation and representation, and start 
thinking about it in terms of performance, in terms of doing things, things that are 
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consequentional in the world. Performance is the place we should start from, not reason, 
language, representations, symbols. And the key point is that if one starts from performance, 
Cartesian dualism collapses. We humans are performative agents—we do things in the 
world—but so do rocks and stones, cats and TV sets, stars and machine tools. At the level of 
performance, we are the same as everything else; we are not different in kind. And 
furthermore, at the level of performance, we are constitutively engaged with our environment: 
we do consequential things to it, and it does things back to us, on and on forever in what I like 
to call an open-ended dance of agency (Pickering 1995a). We are stuck, so to speak, in the 
thick of things—we can never step outside and take command as traditional sociology likes to 
imagine. 
 
So the paradigm shift I have in mind moves in a non-dualist direction by emphasising 
performance rather than will and representation and cognition, and by recognising that 
performance densely and constitutively enmeshes us in the world rather than splitting us off 
from it. To throw in some more words, the dualist social sciences are ‘humanist’ in the sense 
that they find their explanatory variables exclusively in the human and social world, while the 
perspective that I associate with STS is instead ‘posthumanist,’ decentring the human and 
foregrounding instead nondualist couplings of people and things. 
 
If you want an image to hang onto, look at the jade sculpture shown in fig. 1. At the bottom 
right you can see some small figures, and in other places you can see traces of human 
constructions—an archway in the middle; a stairway towards the top. But these are minor 
parts of the overall composition, not the key elements of it: the trees, mountains and clouds 
are much more powerful and striking, and the people nestle amongst them. The vision here is 
of humanity as just a part of a larger world, and this sort of vision is, I would say, a necessary 
condition for finding questions of materiality and space, the concrete substrate of our being, 
interesting. And then we can note that this little sculpture is not Western. It is Chinese; it 
exemplifies what I think of as a Taoist ontology, not a Cartesian one. 
 
FIGURE 1: JADE MOUNTAIN, 1700-1725 AD. Source: Oriental Museum, Durham 
Unversity 
 
And to stay with the East, for a small but perspicuous example of how we are plugged into the 
larger social world, we could think about bonsai trees (fig. 2). In an obvious sense, keeping a 
bonsai tree is itself a decentred dance of agency, between the tree—a nonhuman agent—
which continually grows new shoots in unpredictable places and directions, and a human 
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agent who reacts to that, trimming the shoots here and there in pursuit of an emergent 
aesthetic, and so on, back and forth between the human and the nonhuman. Bonsai, then, can 
be a model for how we exist in the world in general, and this points us in one direction to the 
posthumanist analysis of a dense performative engagement with the world, and in the other to 
Taoism again, with its nonmodern understanding of the world as endless decentred flows, 
transformations and becomings. 
 
FIGURE 2: BONSAI TREE. Credit: Jane Flaxington 
 
But isn’t Taoism one of those premodern philosophies that the Scientific Revolution and the 
Enlightenment were supposed to have demolished? This turn to the East, which I want to take 
seriously, is a marker of the price to be paid for throwing in your lot with posthumanist STS. I 
think the Taoists got it right about how the world is, and we modern Cartesians have got it 
wrong.1 
 
• 
 
More than images and philosophies, we need examples of what is at stake in the shift to the 
posthumanist paradigm. Most directly, it is interesting and important to explore and 
appreciate the ways in which management and organsational forms are emergently mangled 
alongside the introduction of new technologies (and vice versa), but rather than enter into the 
existing literature on this (see, for example, Orlikwski and Scott 2008, Jones and Rose 2005, 
Barrett et al 2011, Lynchnell 2011) I aim here, as I said, to widen the frame, and I want to 
begin with technologies of the self. 
 
The dualist conception of the self is that of a stable, reliable centre of the action, autonomous, 
calculating and rational that one can appeal to as an explanatory variable. The great 
achievement of Michel Foucault was to show that this distinctly modern self, if it exists at all, 
is a historical creation, not the essence of humanity. In Discipline and Punish (1979), 
Foucault showed how the materialities of architecture, partitioning space and organising lines 
of sight, can function to transform inner states, making men docile, engineering a certain 
                                     
1 On traditional Chinese philosophy and its resonance with posthumanist STS, see Li (2012). The 
crossover centres on the common focus on practice and performance (rather than cognition and 
epistemology), a decentring of humanity and the recognition of change as a fundamental ontological 
category. There is also a mismatch, inasmuch as traditional Chinese philosophy adds to this basic 
picture notions of Yin and Yang and a series of pictures, the finite series of trigrams and hexagrams of 
the I Ching used in the interpretation of change (Blofeld 1991). These additional elements are 
themselves integral to traditional Chinese thought, though I am unable to find a place for them in my 
own analysis. 
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version of the modern self. The central insight of the book is that specific human selves are 
made in specific human/nonhuman assemblages. The phrase ‘technologies of the self’ comes 
from Foucault’s later work (1988) in which he explored ways in which people have worked 
on themselves to systematically transform their inner being. Often these have entailed purely 
mental disciplines—the Stoics, for example, tried to imagine themselves in the worst possible 
situations, so that they could face up to them with equanimity if they ever really happened. 
But we can still think of this in terms of performativity. The self is multiple, and technologies 
of the self set up inner automatisms or machines that act as a check on other automatisms. 
 
I take the idea of technologies of the self more literally and materially than Foucault. The 
counterculture of the 1960s, for example, deployed all sorts of material technologies in what 
we used to call ‘explorations of consciousness.’ Sensory deprivation tanks, biofeedback set-
ups, stroboscopes, dream machines and psychedelic drugs all figured as doorways to altered 
states. Very strikingly here, new selves and subject-positions emerged in performative 
interactions with material set-ups. In The Doors of Perception, Aldous Huxley described and 
explored a new relation to the world and his own inner being that went with his first 
experience of mescaline, and in his follow-up essay, Heaven and Hell, he argued that all 
mystical experience f unity with the divine depends on some such material technology, 
including, for instance, fasting, flagellation, chanting and meditation, as well as strobes 
(Huxley 1956; see also Lilly 1972, Geiger 2003, Pickering 2010). 
 
Examples like these help us to see that far from being a stable given, the human self is itself 
materially produced and engineered. But one qualification is important. Technologies of the 
self are not causal in a linear sense. LSD elicits bad trips as well as good ones; the same 
molecules but very different effects. Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion (1999) once did a 
fascinating study of the ways in which drug users and music lovers construct specific set-
ups—which they called dispositifs, following Francois Jullien (1999)—to optimise their 
experiences, tuning themselves, one could say, materially and socially, into an open-ended 
space of possibilities. When should you take this drug, in the morning or the evening? Alone 
or in company with other people? Alone or in the company of other drugs? And what should 
you do while taking it? Gomart and Hennion have a lovely quote from someone saying ‘I 
steal so naturally’ when on some drug I can’t remember. 
 
Natalie Dow Schull’s (2005) study of digital gambling goes along the same lines. She 
explores the ways in which gamblers find their way into ‘the zone’—a space of mindless 
detachment from the mundane world, characterised by a feeling of seamless flow. This is, of 
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course, a sort of dualist separation from the world, but it depends, nevertheless, on all sorts of 
non-dualist material couplings. The gambling machine itself—an automated slot machine—is 
crucial. Nothing would happen without it. But many more levels of tuning are also involved. 
The gamblers learn to put paper cups on adjacent seats to keep other human beings away, and 
stick tooth-picks in the mechanism so that one gambling episode follows automatically from 
another. And from the other side, engineers endlessly tinker with the hardware and software 
to help the gamblers entrain themselves to the machines more effectively. The machines are 
equipped to make possible drink orders and cash withdrawals without human intervention; the 
software becomes adaptive, speeding up or slowing down play in response to the revealed 
preferences of the gambler. 
 
I can make two observations on this example and then we can move on. One is that gambling 
machines have a dual function: they are the pathway for gamblers into the zone, and, at the 
same time, they plug the gamblers into the circuits of capital. This inner/outer connection is 
probably always a feature of technologies of the self. The Stoic’s inner stability goes with the 
role of ruler of the outer, political, state. Inner calm and non-violent political protest hang 
together with meditation as the pivot. Explorations of consciousness were integral to the 
counterculture as a distinctive form of life. So matter here can be seen as helping to constitute 
both specific selves and the specific social structures with which they hang together. 
 
Second, the gambling example (like bonsai) points to the concept of emergence. As I said, the 
machine causes nothing; it is not the explanation of the gambler’s behaviour. Instead, the 
gambler has to find out out how to use the machine in practice, how to tune themselves into it. 
Likewise, the machines, and the engineers behind them, have to find out how to use the 
gambler. Nothing in this trajectory of coupled findings-out is given in advance. It is emergent 
in the brutal sense of not being predictable or even explicable in terms of independent 
variables. And just like the coupling of people and things, emergence is something which is 
hard for the western imagination to take in. The shadow of the Cartesian machine still hangs 
over the social sciences. To find any inspiration for thinking about such processes you would 
have to look elsewhere: to biological notions of co-evolution, say, or further afield, to eastern 
philosophy—the Taoist image, again, of the world as a place of endless decentred becomings. 
 
• 
 
We can leave the self behind and move from the micro to the macro and think about 
technoscience, the coupling of science, industry and the economy that we take for granted 
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today and that seems to be the last hope of the west. As is well known, one of the first 
important examples of technoscience dates back to the second half of the 19th century and the 
dye industry: a whole series of synthetic dyes were discovered which were the foundation of a 
new industry and a new sort of chemistry, and the new industry and the new science grew 
together as a new sort of scientific/industrial assemblage (Pickering 2005, forthcoming). The 
story is too rich to get into here, but I do want to suggest that it is, in a way, isomorphous with 
what I just said about technologies of the self. 
 
We can start by noting the obvious. As Thomas Pynchon wrote in Gravity’s Rainbow (1975), 
‘If you want to know the truth, you have to look into the heart of certain molecules’; the 
synthetic dye industry was absolutely dependent on emergent properties of matter, on how 
matter turned out to perform. The key event was the discovery of the dye called mauve, by 
William Henry Perkin in London in 1849, and the key point to note is that Perkin was not 
trying to produce a dye at all. He wanted to synthesise the antimalarial drug quinine, and it 
just so happened that when he mixed certain chemicals and processed them in a certain way 
he arrived at a substance that could dye cloth a pretty colour. Here again then we find brutal 
emergence in the domain of matter, something completely unpredictable in advance that was 
immensely consequential for human history. And similar emergent material phenomena 
marked the whole history of this industry. It was important, for example, that mauve was not 
alone. Experimenting with different chemicals, chemists succeeded in synthesising an ever-
expanding list of coloured substances that could serve as dyes. Emergent material phenomena 
here were absolutely central to the emergence of the world we live in now. 
 
At the same time, it is important to think how these substances were drawn into the human 
world, and especially how they were transplanted from the laboratory into chemical factories. 
Scaling up their production proved to be non-trivial. Attempts to do so were dogged by 
explosions and the destruction of lives and property. Again, we would have to say that it just 
so happened that Perkin and others found ways to more or less safely scale up the process, 
cooling the reactants to prevent explosive boiling. They could have failed in this negotiation 
with the emergent properties of matter, and technoscientific dye production might never have 
happened. This is a point that has interested me a lot recently. A century and a half after 
Perkin, chemical factories still explode. So we have this paradoxical situation in which the 
social sciences resist seeing that matter has agency, while, out there in the real world, the 
typical problem is to contain material agency, to keep it in check and channel it, to shield 
ourselves from it. Disastrous failures like Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima can serve to 
bring this point home. And much human labour is, in fact, devoted to maintenance schedules 
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and the like which would make no sense without a recognition of the performative agency of 
matter that they try to keep in check, an attempt which necessarily, I would say, fails from 
time to time. Our entire world is built on this sort of chancy engagement with the material 
world. We live on performative islands of stability (Pickering 2011a). The social sciences 
need to be able to get that into focus. 
 
But what about science? We are taught to think that we have science to thank for 
technoscience, as if the science comes first and makes industry and the modern economy 
possible, A performative perspective suggests that this is a mistake. Perkin had no idea what 
he was doing when he synthesised mauve—or, at least, only a mistaken idea. And the 
blossoming of the dye industry was integral, in fact, to a transformation of chemists’ 
understandings of matter. Chemical theory struggled to keep up, trying to rationalise what had 
already been accomplished, and a good theory was one that could do that, and also help in 
some way in moving forward to new processes and syntheses. Kekulé’s benzene ring theory, 
which I fell in love with at school, was the outcome of this competition, not the cause of 
anything. 
 
So again we have the image of co-evolution, now of matter and knowledge, with fields of 
emergent material properties and scientific representations growing together, like biological 
species constituting environments for one another or like gamblers and gambling machines, 
or humans and bonsai trees. And I should, of course, throw in the social here, too. One way 
into this is to ask about the role of capitalism in this whole story. Certainly the mauve 
synthesis only counted as an emergent property of matter in a world where textiles and 
textile-dying were already major industries, so could we not say that capital was the cause of 
all that followed? In a way, I think we could. But not in the sense that capital was a cause that 
somehow contained subsequent events within itself (as the collision of two snooker balls 
determines their later trajectories). Nothing was predictable here. Just as Perkin had to find 
out how to scale up the mauve synthesis, so capital had to find out how to latch onto it, in a 
process that emergently transformed the social landscape and capital itself. New links had to 
be set up between producers of raw materials (coal miners instead of farmers) to dyers. In the 
1880s, science was itself built into capital for the first time, in the shape of a new social 
institution, the industrial research laboratory, now enfolded within the body of industry (on 
organsiational ‘enfolding’ see also Pickering 1995b). New career paths appeared for 
academically trained chemists; universities changed form to foster these, especially in 
Germany. Patent law was also renegotiated to turn chemical syntheses into revenue streams, 
and so on. 
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So, if capital was a cause, it was also at stake and emergently transformed here, mutating like 
the evolutionary becoming of a strange plant or animal in history in its entanglements with 
the powers of nature and our knowledge of them—not any sort of independent exogenous 
controller of events. Capital lives and becomes in the thick of things, just like digital gamblers 
and academic scientists. 
 
• 
 
I have so far been offering a sort of detached analysis of technologies of the self and of 
technoscientific production, exploring ways that materiality intertwines with the human and 
the social. This is a standard academic project, the kind of thing that most of us do most of the 
time. But my last example goes in a different direction. Once we have recognised the 
constituent role of material agency in human affairs: so what? Could it point us towards doing 
things differently? I think the answer is yes and that the change involved would be for the 
better. My third example concerns styles of management. 
 
The dominant form of management today is reflexive to the sort of dualist social science we 
want to get away from. This style of management aims to instal a small class of elite 
managers as classical human agents in control of an organisation (including its human 
components) which has been turned into a predictable machine. That is certainly how my 
university, for example, is run, and English universities in general. The question now is: could 
we imagine a style of management that is reflexive instead to posthumanist STS, that 
somehow foregrounds performance and emergent dances of agency? Could posthumanist 
theory be a constructive resource in management and organisations as well as an analytic 
tool? 
 
In fact, not much imagination is needed to answer these questions. We need only look into the 
margins of our own traditions to find examples of what I have in mind, and I now want to 
discuss a field I have been interested in for a long time: cybernetics (Pickering 2010). 
 
What was, or is, cybernetics? The name comes from kybernetes, the Greek word for 
steersman, and you could think of cybernetics as the science of steering. But we can go a step 
further. Cybernetics is about steering something like a sailboat, and the art of sailing is a 
performative one, of getting along with the wind, currents and the way water flows round the 
hull, by leaning one way or the other, putting on more or less sail, tightening the rigging or 
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loosening it a bit, and so on. So cybernetics understands steering as a continual decentred, 
performative, emergent dance of agency, as I would say, between the human and the 
nonhuman, the sailor, the boat, the wind and the sea. It thus shares the Taoist and 
posthumanist ontology that I have been talking about all along. More importantly, however, 
the cyberneticians put this vision to work in real-world projects. 
 
The man who did most to translate the basic cybernetic image into management was Stafford 
Beer (1926-2002), the founder of what he called management cybernetics (Beer 1959). And 
Beer’s central objective was precisely to transform management to thematise and foreground 
dances of agency—dense, performative, open-ended interactions—between the internal 
elements of an organisation and between the organisation and its environment. The cybernetic 
organisation would continually find out how the environment reacted to it (buying more or 
less of its products, say) and then react to that, adapting itself to whatever emerged, and so on 
and so on, back and forth. And this was what led Beer and his friend Gordon Pask to an 
interest in biological computing, as it was called (Pickering 2009a). 
 
Beer’s project in the late 1950s was to take the automation of the factory beyond production 
and into management. Especially he wanted to automate the dances of agency that he 
understood to be crucial to management. The idea was to construct adaptive systems to take 
the place of managers in running organisations. Beer thought first of using computers, but 
rejected them as insufficiently lively. A computer does what it is programmed to do; it cannot 
radically reconfigure itself to identify and respond to truly emergent phenomena. In contrast, 
living biological systems are lively by definition, and nature is full of adaptive systems that 
engage in open-ended dances of agency with their surroundings. Beer’s thought was that it 
might be possible to couple one of these into the factory in place of conventional 
management. 
 
To that end, he experimented with a whole range of systems to find out what might work best, 
including colonies of insects and mice, and he even got his own children to play a game that 
found solutions to coupled mathematical equations performatively rather than cognitively. 
Much of this work focussed on pond ecosystems. Pull the humans out of the factory, plug in a 
pond instead, was the idea, and the pond, the factory and the business environment could 
engage in dances of agency, sometimes finding situations of relatively stable equilibrium, but 
also capable of transforming the factory itself and its products into a new and better adapted 
form. 
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I have three comments on this work. First, I just want to say that biological computing is one 
of the most imaginative and visionary projects I have ever come across in the history of 
science, technology and organisations—so wild! Second, we should note that it depends on 
taking matter and its agency very seriously; you would never imagine such a project unless 
you had the sense of steering a ship in a world that performs in unpredictable ways. 
Cybernetic management and biological computing were, then, reflexive to posthumanist 
STS—they played out a posthumanist ontology; they were in the same paradigmatic space—
in much the same way as the management of English universities, with their fantasy of 
collecting power in a few individuals, is reflexive to standard, humanist social theory. This is 
the important general point here. As well as opening up new perspectives on existing forms of 
organisation and management, posthumanism helps us to see that radically different forms are 
possible and interesting; it can function as a radically transformative resource within 
organisations as well as offering a new and distinctive angle from which to examine them. 
 
My third comment is, of course, that, sadly, biological computing never quite worked. 
Organisations today are not managed by ponds or colonies of mice. Beer’s project ended in 
the early 60s. But not, I want to stress, on any point of principle; rather, on the practical 
difficulty of getting biological systems to care about us. In one experiment, for example, Beer 
induced pond insects, Daphnia, to ingest iron filings, so that applied magnetic fields 
representing key industrial variables would constitute the environment to which they adapted. 
The Daphnia, however, just excreted the iron, creating a rusty brown medium impervious to 
the fields—this mode of coupling just did not work. The crowning achievement of the 
biological computing project was to grow a body of electrochemical threads that developed a 
new sense—namely, an ability to respond to specific sounds: an ear! (Cariani 1993)—that had 
not been designed into it, again an amazing and magical accomplishment from the perspective 
of conventional computing. But in 1962 Beer more or less gave up, lamenting the lack of 
support for this research, which he had been conducting in his spare time (while leading the 
Operations Research Group of a major steel company in his working hours). 
 
From the 1960s onwards Beer went in a new direction, developing what he called the Viable 
System Model of adaptive organisation, the VSM (Beer 1981). Instead of incorporating real 
biological material into the organisation, Beer’s idea was now to model information flows 
within the organisation on the most adaptive biological system he could think of: the human 
brain and nervous system. The organisation itself was to become a giant adaptive cyborg, 
partly human and partly nonhuman (figs 3, 4). 
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FIGURE 3: CONTROL SYSTEMS IN (A) THE HUMAN BODY, (B) THE FIRM. 
Source: Beer (1981, 131, figs 22 and 23). 
 
FIGURE 4: THE VSM DIAGRAM. Source: Beer (1985, 136, fig 37). 
 
The VSM diagram became Beer’s trademark, and it shows information pathways between 
five levels of the organisation modelled on their biological equivalents, running between 
production units at level 1 and the board of directors at level 5 through various intermediary 
levels and the firm’s environment. Much of Beer’s attention focussed on level 3, which 
housed a set of operations research models of the organisation, and level 4, home for a big 
computer model of the firm’s world, the wider economy. And these models deserve some 
further thought before we move on. If biological computing was a purely performative 
project, these models were instead representational. So how should we think about them? 
 
Beer was scathing about traditional management. In 1973 he published an essay with the 
great title, ‘The Surrogate World We Manage’ (1973), analysing the way in which managers 
become bewitched by paper representations of their organisations and entirely lose contact 
with the things in themselves. Beer’s take on representations and models was that they could 
be helpful, but we should not trust them. We should continually monitor the performance of 
the organisation and regularly revise our models in the light of this. So the models themselves 
should be explicitly in the plane of practice, we could say, bound up with performance and 
dances of agency, not external criteria to be imposed on them. With the VSM, then, we are 
still in the world of performance, but now including representational elements as themselves 
mangled, growing open-endedly and organically in their engagement with performance—
much as, in fact, chemical theory was bound up with the development of the dye industry. 
This is a further sense in which cybernetic management is reflexive to posthumanist theory. 
 
The VSM was the basis for all of Beer’s consultancy work and has many followers in 
management today, but I can note that the most ambitious application of it was forty years 
ago now, to the entire Chilean economy under the socialist regime of Salvador Allende in the 
early 70s. Project Cybersyn, as it was called, went a long way in a couple of years before it 
was cut off by the Pinochet coup. 
 
One further aspect of the VSM is worth discussing here. As I said, Beer insisted that internal 
relations within the organisation should themselves have the form of a performative dance of 
agency. This is the significance of the reciprocating arrows linking systems 3 and 4 in fig 4. 
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The relation between levels was supposed to be a process of ‘reciprocal vetoing,’ of proposal 
and counterproposal, until some sort of equilibrium emerged which all of the parties could 
live with. This constructive give and take is precisely what the management of my university 
lacks, with its reporting chains only going upwards and a monological flow of orders 
travelling in the opposite direction. 
 
But what should those reciprocating linkages look like? How should they be staged? What 
form should they take? When he was working in the steel industry in Sheffield, Beer 
improvised. He would try to grab members of higher management and union representatives 
after work on Friday afternoons and drag them into his office to drink whisky, just to see what 
would happen if they talked openly to one another—something which, again. would never 
happen in my university. As a consultant, Beer developed a more structured approach to 
decentred decision-making in a process he called Syntegration (Beer 1994). Syntegration is a 
complex process of many iterations, usually extended over several days, but the basic idea is 
to assign participants to the edges of a notional icosahedron, and to organise a process of 
sequential discussions between the parties whose edges end at a common vertex, alternating 
in steps between the vertices at the end of each edge. In this way arguments can progressively 
echo all around the icosahedron, eventually taking an emergent form controlled by no-one in 
particular. 
 
Syntegrations have been performed on many topics, running from the reorganisation of the 
British OR Society (of which Beer was President) up to Israeli-Palestinian relations and world 
peace, and they continue to be held today. And one further observation is relevant here. 
Syntegration does depend on some simple material technologies—recording and circulating 
the outcomes of different phases of discussion—and also on the control of space—
systematically putting groups of people together and keeping others apart. But the process is 
primarily representational and linguistic—it is talk. Nevertheless, it is talk which is 
performative. If Syntegration stages anything, it is open-ended, emergent and transformative 
dances of agency between the human participants. And my comment on this is that it reminds 
us of something that should probably be obvious, that posthumanism is not just about 
materiality; it is about understanding people differently too: not as carriers of fixed properties 
(interests, values. symbol systems, expertise, or whatever) but as malleable, mangle-able, 
always liable to become something new in interaction with each other as well as with things. 
The most powerful example I am familiar with is the 1960s antipsychiatry movement, in 
which the psychiatrists hoped to become something new themselves in their interaction with 
the mad (Pickering 2009b). 
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• 
 
I have tried to conjure up some ways in which materiality helps constitute our human world, 
at the microlevel of selves and the macrolevel of technoscience, and also to ask how a 
recognition of this might fed into new ways of conducting ourselves in the world. But I want 
to end with one last remark about Stafford Beer. 
 
Much of Beer’s writing took the usual technical form. His books on management are, for 
example, full of intimidating mathematics and complex diagrams like fig. 4. But he was 
disgusted with the modern west after the Pinochet coup, and in his later writings he 
increasingly revealed a less conventional side of his work and thought—the fact that his 
management cybernetics was, in fact, drenched in a sort of non-standard spirituality. The 
early work on biological computing points to what I call a hylozoist awe and wonder at the 
agency of matter—the idea that everything we need is already there in nature: why waste so 
much time and energy making silicon chips and computers when your local pond will run the 
factory for you? Beer wrote a poem, a sort of hymn of praise, about the computing power of 
the Irish Sea (Blohm, Beer and Suzuki 1986, 52). 
 
Though I have not mentioned it before, the VSM has a recursive structure (fig 4), so that 
within any system 1, say, is nested a whole replica of the VSM, and this goes on up and down 
the scale forever. And Beer understood this in terms of a great chain of being stretching 
upwards from biological cells to the cosmos. Syntegration, in turn, was envisaged as giving 
rise to a genuine group mind, again located on a spectrum running from the yogic chakras up 
to a transcendental unity with the divine. And Beer himself lived out these understandings. 
After Chile, he spent half of each year in Toronto working as a management consultant and 
the other half living in a primitive stone cottage in Wales where he taught tantric yoga. In 
Beer’s cybernetics, then, the mundane and the spiritual ran continuously into one another, 
rather than being assigned to separate ontological realms. 
 
What can we say about this? I was surprised when I first found spiritual threads like these 
running all through the history of cybernetics. Now, I am not (Pickering 2011b). Once you 
start thinking about decentred dances of agency, where would you look for inspiration? Not 
modern science or philosophy. You would have to look backwards to alchemy, witchcraft and 
magic, or sideways, to India, China or wherever. The tantra for Beer; I have referred to 
Taoism here; the last sentence of my book, The Mangle of Practice, was ‘The dance of 
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agency as the dance of Shiva.’ The gravitational pull of the East takes over. As I said before, 
taking materiality seriously involves a paradigm shift and some serious mental gymnastics, 
and things look very differently afterwards. 
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